My understanding of TARP's and the stress tests' (which had their own credibility crisis) impact on the banks' health is that they instilled a sense of confidence in investors who have since helped to re-capitalize the banks. As Larry Summers told Ryan Lizza in a recent New Yorker profile, the key to a bailout is managing public (especially investor) confidence in the viability of the banks:
[Summers] pointed out that full nationalization of a financial institution might trigger systemic shocks, as investors retreated from other banks, creating exactly the kind of panic that nationalization was intended to prevent. (As [Obama economic official Gene] Sperling often argued, "You might come out and say, 'I'm gonna take over Bank of America and Wells Fargo, but everybody else is safe!' Maybe they believe you. And maybe they don't. But if you get this wrong the Dow's at thirty-five hundred! You're the worst economic manager in the history of the United States!")Crisis management is difficult. There's a short-term gain to telling white lies to keep confidence in the system, but a long-term risk, because the revelation of their falseness can destroy that confidence. But I've yet to see a convincing argument that September and October 2008 were anything less than a remarkable, if imperfect, tango of financial improvisation that largely worked to save our financial system.
This article available online at:
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2009/10/did-the-governments-white-lies-endanger-the-bailout/27800/
