In a new column [link expires in a fortnight] for National Journal, I give some ground to the case for more aid for the Detroit Three. (I'll give Jonathan Cohn the credit, by the way: this is a great piece.) The point is that the bankruptcy process is impaired. Still, I think, the dire consequences of allowing GM to go bust are being exaggerated.
Now, bailout advocates say, consider the consequences. A note on this by the Center for Automotive Research (which you could say has a vested interest, but let that pass) has been widely cited in the past few days. It says that 3 million jobs could be lost. How does the center get to this number, when all three companies employ about 240,000 people, or less than one-tenth of that figure? It adds about 1 million more jobs at firms that supply the car manufacturers. Then it tacks on 1.7 million in "spin-off employment," which means jobs lost across the economy as a whole because of reduced spending by workers with Detroit's Big Three and their suppliers.
It would surely take more than the bankruptcy of GM to shut down all three companies and wipe out the industry's supplier network (which, remember, serves foreign-owned companies as well). The failure of one firm would help the survivors. The most-valuable assets of the failed company would most likely be acquired by its competitors. The technology for the forthcoming Chevy Volt -- the plug-in electric vehicle that some enthralled commentators seem to think justifies a $50 billion bailout all by itself -- would be snapped up by another company if it is as promising as its supporters say. Fiscal stimulus could reduce any spin-off unemployment. The collapse of GM would be a heavy blow all right, but not the end of life as we know it. Even if all three firms collapsed, the claim that this would destroy 3 million jobs is far-fetched.
Nonetheless, the view that the normal Chapter 11 process is likely to fail in this case has some weight. At a time when the economy is weak and the bankruptcy system impaired, when a good independent case can be made for a second fiscal stimulus of $500 billion or more to sustain demand and preserve jobs, it is difficult to argue with conviction that employers the size of the Big Three should be denied all help. But in coming to the rescue, if it does, the government should demand both a bankruptcy-like restructuring of the companies and a share in the upside.
Beyond the question of the bailout, what does the plight of the US car makers imply for the new administration's policy on unions?
The Democratic Party is allied with the unions, a marriage of head and heart. Obama has promised to support the "card-check" legislation that the unions see as vital for expanding their membership and bargaining power. The state of American auto manufacturing -- an example of union power in action -- ought to give him pause.
No doubt there is plenty of blame to go around for the mess that the industry is in. Epic management incompetence has played its part. So has shortsighted economic policy, which kept the price of gasoline in the U.S. at a fraction of what it was in other industrial countries. (If fuel is dirt cheap, you cannot fault consumers for wanting to drive SUVs, or car manufacturers for selling the vehicles that buyers want.) But on top of that, the unions raised wages and benefits to insupportable levels, and for years blocked efforts to cut costs and increase efficiency. Worst of all, by anointing themselves co-managers, they reduced the domestic industry's ability to react promptly to shifts in demand. Is this how the Democratic Party intends to strengthen the economy?
This article available online at:
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2008/11/does-obama-still-want-stronger-unions/9111/
