Ben Bernanke listened to his critics, but the recovery is still stuck. What went wrong?
To print or not to print? That is the question dividing the Federal Reserve.
Back in September the Fed launched its latest, and most ambitious, bond-buying program to date, dubbed QE3. Unlike before, the Fed hasn't committed to buying a specific dollar amount of bonds with QE3; instead, it's committed to buying $85 billion of bonds a month until the labor market improves "substantially". But what's "substantial" and what's not? And what if the Fed loses its nerve before the economy arrives at this mysterious moment of "substantial" improvement?
This latter question has gripped markets after the Fed's January meeting when "a number" of members said it should "taper" its bond purchases even before, you guessed it, there's any substantial improvement in unemployment. In other words, an increasing, and increasingly vocal, minority at the Fed are nervous about keeping open-ended bond-buying quite so open-ended. Now, a vocal minority is still a minority -- and besides, Bernanke tends to get his way -- but this hawkish talk has been enough to spook markets that thought QE3 wouldn't end much before 2014.
But there's a better question than how long QE3 will last. That's how much QE3 will work. Let's back up for a minute. Whether you want to call it "quantitative easing" (QE) or "bond-buying" or "large-scale asset purchases" (LSAP), the idea here is fairly simple: the Fed is printing money and buying pieces of paper. It's doing this because it can't boost the economy like it normally does by cutting short-term interest rates; those rates are stuck at zero, and can't go lower. Okay, that's not entirely true. The Fed can't cut nominal rates now, but it can cut real ones -- in other words, it can push up inflation, thereby reducing inflation-adjusted borrowing costs. That's what the Fed has done by printing money and buying long-term bonds from banks. Even if this freshly-printed money ends up as bank reserves (which it mostly has), the Fed is signaling that it wants more inflation.
Take a look at the chart below of what markets (roughly) think will happen with inflation over the next 5 years, annotated with the Fed's unconventional policies. Markets expect more inflation every time the Fed eases, and less every time it stops ... until QE3. Then, almost nothing. That's crazy. QE3 is open-ended, whereas previous rounds were not. This difference should have convinced markets that this time the Fed was really serious about jump-starting the recovery. Has QE hit a wall of diminishing returns? (Note: The black line shows the Fed's 2 percent inflation target).
Look again, but this time, focus on the black line. QE has hit a wall, but it's a wall of incredibly well-anchored inflation expectations, not diminishing returns. In other words, the Fed has quite easily been able to push inflation expectations back up to its 2 percent target, but no more. QE1 and QE2 had big effects, because they came when expected inflation was well below 2 percent and falling; QE3 has not, because expected inflation was already around 2 percent.
But wait. The Fed unveiled the Evans rule back in December, telling us it wouldn't raise rates before unemployment falls to 6.5 percent or inflation rises to 2.5 percent. In other words, isn't the Fed's 2 percent inflation target really a 2.5 percent inflation target now? Not exactly. The Fed is telling us it will tolerate 2.5 percent inflation, not that it will create it -- indeed, the Fed doesn't think inflation will stray at all above 2 percent over the next few years.
The best way to figure out what the Fed wants is to listen. After all, it tells us what it thinks will happen with GDP, unemployment, and inflation over 1, 2, and 3-year periods. Now, it's GDP and unemployment predictions have been, in the spirit of generosity, a tad optimistic, but not so for inflation (which, not-so-coincidentally, is the only above variable the Fed controls directly). The chart below looks at the Fed's core PCE inflation projections since late 2008; upper-range estimates for 1, 2, and 3-year periods are in red, and lower ranges ones are in blue. This is what a 2 percent inflation ceiling looks like.
There's a lot going on here, but there's a depressingly simple message in this chart: QE3 isn't working, because the Fed doesn't want it to work. The Fed revised its inflation projections up after QE1 and QE2, and markets followed; the Fed has kept its inflation projections steady after QE3, and, again, markets have followed. Now, this doesn't mean QE3 is entirely useless -- it's at least stopping inflation expectations from falling -- just that it could be doing much more if the Fed let it. That would be simple enough. The Fed could make its forecasts symmetrical around 2 percent, rather than peaking at 2 percent. Or it could say it expected (or is that wanted?) inflation well above 2 percent over the next two years, but not after that; in other words, make its target more explicitly flexible.
That leaves us with one last question. The Fed has shown time and again it can push inflation expectations (which largely determine inflation) up to 2 percent, even when short-term rates are parked at zero. But is that as much inflation as the Fed can create? It's hard to see why that would be the case, other than the Fed's self-imposed 2 percent ceiling. But the great thing about self-imposed problems is you can stop imposing them. The Fed doesn't need a new mandate (like NGDP targeting) to speed up the recovery; it just needs to tell us it wants -- gasp! -- 3 percent inflation for a year or two.
Until then, the recovery will suffer the outrageous slings and arrows of our 2 percent ceiling.
The American republic was long safeguarded by settled norms, now shattered by the rise of Donald Trump.
A long time ago, more than 20 years in fact, the Wall Street Journal published a powerful, eloquent editorial, simply headlined: “No Guardrails.”
In our time, the United States suffers every day of the week because there are now so many marginalized people among us who don't understand the rules, who don't think that rules of personal or civil conduct apply to them, who have no notion of self-control.
Twenty years later, that same newspaper is edging toward open advocacy in favor of Donald Trump, the least self-controlled major-party candidate for high office in the history of the republic. And as he forged his path to the nomination, he snapped through seven different guardrails, revealing how brittle the norms that safeguard the American republic had grown.
Oregon, one of the whitest states in the union, also has one of the most generous safety nets. Is that a coincidence or something more troubling?
SALEM, Oregon—In much of the country, poor people are finding that there are fewer and fewer government benefits available to help them stay afloat. But here in this progressive corner of the Northwest, the poor can access an extensive system of state-sponsored supports and services.
In Oregon, a higher share of poor families is on welfare (now called TANF, or Temporary Aid to Needy Families) than in most states. The state has some of the highest food stamp uptake in the country. It subsidizes childcare for working parents, asking the poorest of them to contribute as little as $27 a month. It helps people get off of welfare by linking them to employment and paying their wages for up to six months, and then allows them to continue to receive food stamps as they transition to higher wages. Families can be on welfare for up to 60 months, as opposed to 24 months in many other states, and once the parents are cut off due to time limits, their children can still continue to receive aid.
Science says lasting relationships come down to—you guessed it—kindness and generosity.
Every day in June, the most popular wedding month of the year, about 13,000 American couples will say “I do,” committing to a lifelong relationship that will be full of friendship, joy, and love that will carry them forward to their final days on this earth.
Except, of course, it doesn’t work out that way for most people. The majority of marriages fail, either ending in divorce and separation or devolving into bitterness and dysfunction. Of all the people who get married, only three in ten remain in healthy, happy marriages, as psychologist Ty Tashiro points out in his book The Science of Happily Ever After, which was published earlier this year.
Social scientists first started studying marriages by observing them in action in the 1970s in response to a crisis: Married couples were divorcing at unprecedented rates. Worried about the impact these divorces would have on the children of the broken marriages, psychologists decided to cast their scientific net on couples, bringing them into the lab to observe them and determine what the ingredients of a healthy, lasting relationship were. Was each unhappy family unhappy in its own way, as Tolstoy claimed, or did the miserable marriages all share something toxic in common?
Three Atlantic staffers discuss “Blood of My Blood,” the sixth episode of the sixth season.
Every week for the sixth season of Game of Thrones, Christopher Orr, Spencer Kornhaber, and Lenika Cruz will be discussing new episodes of the HBO drama. Because no screeners are being made available to critics in advance this year, we'll be posting our thoughts in installments.
He lives near San Francisco, makes more than $50,000 per year, and is voting for the billionaire to fight against political correctness.
For several days, I’ve been corresponding with a 22-year-old Donald Trump supporter. He is white, has a bachelor’s degree, and earns $50,000 to $60,000 per year.
He lives near San Francisco.
“I recently became engaged to my Asian fiancée who is making roughly 3 times what I make, and I am completely supportive of her and proud she is doing so well,” he wrote. “We’ve both benefitted a lot from globalization. We are young, urban, and have a happy future planned. We seem molded to be perfect young Hillary supporters,” he observed, “but we're not. In 2016, we're both going for Trump.”
At first, we discussed Bill Clinton.
Last week, I wrote an article asking why Trump supporters aren’t bothered that their candidate called Clinton a shameful abuser of women who may well be a rapist. After all, Trump used to insist that Clinton was a victim of unfair treatment during his sex scandals. Either Trump spent years defending a man that he believed to be a sexual predator, even welcoming him as a guest at his wedding, or Trump is now cynically exploiting a rape allegation that he believes to be false.
Why do reality television’s most popular stars so uncannily resemble the heroines of the 19th-century writer’s work?
One of the more unconventional fairytales of our time involves a brilliant schemer, famous almost entirely for her physical attributes, who finds herself a single mother after her partner abruptly departs. Intent on bettering her situation, the woman pursues the wealthy and eligible son of a noted family, several members of whom she’s already intimately involved with. His relatives panic. But the man remains besotted with the woman, whose meticulous plotting and social savvy make him ever more intent on proposing marriage to her.
The person in question is, obviously, Blac Chyna. She’s also Susan Vernon, the antiheroine at the center of one of Jane Austen’s earliest works, Lady Susan. Their resemblance on the face of it might seem completely absurd: Blac Chyna, born Angela Renée White in Washington, D.C. in 1988, is a model and former exotic dancer best known for her romantic relationship with the rapper Tyga, her friendship with the reality-TV star Kim Kardashian, and the complications that have ensued (currently being televised on Keeping Up With the Kardashians) when Tyga started dating Kim’s sister and Chyna became pregnant with Kim’s brother’s baby. Lady Susan Vernon is a fictional character created by Austen in 1794 or so—an English widow in her mid-to-late 30s who idles away her hours in the stately homes of her aristocratic acquaintances and is described as possessing “an uncommon union of symmetry, brilliance, and grace.”
A real-time chronicle of Donald Trump’s unpresidential statements.
People will look back on this era in our history, to see what was known about Donald Trump while Americans were deciding whether to choose him as president. Here’s a running chronicle from James Fallows on the ways in which Trump has been unpresidential in an unprecedented way, and of the evidence available to voters as they make their choice. (If you’d like to flag examples to include, please let us know.)
Why root for the Giants or the Jets when you could be a fan of the Tender Juicy Hotdogs or the Corned Beef Cowboys?
The iconography of major corporations has crept into nearly every unclaimed physical nook that exists in American sports. Take the basketball arena: Toyota’s name is painted on the hardwood, Geico’s on the basket’s framework, and Verizon shrouds the underbelly of the scoreboard. Recently, the Philadelphia 76ers announced the NBA’s first deal to put a sponsor’s patch on their uniforms, practically weaving corporations into the fabric of the game.
But even the most jaded of American sports fans would likely be surprised at just how deeply corporations are embedded into the Philippine Basketball Association, a league as popular in its home country as it is unheard of in the U.S. There, a small corporate patch—a headline-earning development in the U.S.—would barely attract attention. In the Philippines, corporations don’t just sponsor teams. They effectively are the teams.
A 1979 book on presidential selection inadvertently predicted the rise of Trump—and the weakness of a popular primary system.
Predictions are dangerous business, especially in the hall of mirrors that American politics has become. Suffice it to say, no one called this U.S. presidential election cycle—not Trump, not Sanders, not any of it.
Except, perhaps, in a round-about way, a 1979 book about the presidential-primary system. James Ceaser, a University of Virginia professor, outlined the history and potential weaknesses of various nomination processes, including one that largely relies on popular primaries. Starting in the early 1970s, Democrats and Republicans began reforming their primary-election processes, transferring influence over nominations away from party leaders to voters. This kind of system is theoretically more democratic, but it also has weaknesses—some of which have been on display in 2016. When I spoke with a couple of conservative political-science professors about their field last month, one of them remarked, with just a hint of jealousy, “I expect Jim Ceaser to take a victory lap around the country saying I told you so.”