Credit Default Swaps and Control Rights, Redux

Felix Salmon and I are usually on the same side of the jury box when it comes to the trial of credit default swaps. However, it appears we have reached an impasse concerning creditor control rights in the context of restructurings and bankruptcies. While that sounds like an awfully narrow issue to quibble about, the policy implications of this seemingly obscure issue are far reaching and call into question both the orderly functioning of the debt markets and the soundness of the current bankruptcy regime.


Let's begin by outlining the issue at hand. In my previous article, I wrote:

Suppose that ABC Co. is on the verge of bankruptcy, but wants to avoid bankruptcy by restructuring its debt (renegotiating interest rates, maturity, etc.) with its bondholders. Further, assume that bondholder B has fully hedged his ABC bonds using CDS, or over-hedged to the point where B would profit from ABC's bankruptcy. The problem seems obvious: B either doesn't care if ABC does or actually wants ABC to file for bankruptcy, and so he will do anything he can to stop ABC from restructuring and force ABC into ruin.

In fairness to Felix, here's his added qualification of the issue from his response to my article:

The problem is a bit more subtle than that, and is simply that bondholders who have bought CDS protection have much less incentive to participate in restructuring negotiations.

The key to understanding why we shouldn't expect this change in incentives to lead to any material change in the restructuring process is rooted in the distinction between incentive to act and power to act. Clearly, anyone who expects to profit more from option A than B will choose A given the chance. And so, a bondholder who expects to receive a larger payout from CDS than from a restructuring will choose the CDS payout given the chance. But does that bondholder have any power to bring this result about? As a general matter, probably not.

One Is the Loneliest Number

Restructurings generally take place across the entire capital structure of firm. A firm could have multiple issuances of bonds, loans, and may even have other hybrid debt-equity financing. Each class of creditors has holders with certain control rights. While this complicates the restructuring efforts for the firm, since the firm will have to coordinate with various classes of creditors which may have competing incentives, it also mitigates the influence that any individual creditor/creditor-class can exert on the restructuring process. In addition, it usually means that the firm will require different thresholds of creditor approval from each class. For example, ABC concludes for a given restructuring plan that it needs the approval of 75% of class A holders, 60% of class B holders, etc. The actual threshold will be determined in large part by two main drivers: (i) the agreements that determine the rights of each creditor class (ii) and the number of on-board creditors needed to make the deal economically feasible.

So, even acknowledging the clear incentive on the part of those who stand to gain more from a bankruptcy than a restructuring, their impact on the success of the restructuring will be determined by their ability to affect the firm's ability to achieve the required thresholds. Thus, their impact will be determined by their ownership stake in the debt. And so, in order for Felix's argument to be taken as a serious point of concern, we must posit the existence of a class of hedged creditors who stand to gain more in bankruptcy than restructuring that is so large and well coordinated that it is able to obstruct the restructuring efforts of the firm and those creditors that stand to gain more from restructuring than bankruptcy. While not impossible in a nominal sense, this strikes me as a rather fortuitous state of affairs.

Bankruptcy Is Not A Sure Bet

In analyzing the incentives of the participants, Felix assumes that bankruptcy is certain in the case that a restructuring fails. This is not necessarily the case. He wrote:

I might end up with just 45 cents on the dollar -- $450,000 -- if I agree to the company's [restructuring] plan. If I just let it go bust, on the other hand, I get $600,000 [from CDS]. And so I have an incentive to opt for the more economically-destructive option.

Every filing for involuntary bankruptcy is reviewed by a judge and can be contested by the debtor. And CDS don't payout until judgment is entered against the debtor. That means payout under a CDS as it relates to bankruptcy is an uncertain event. That means that your expected payout should be discounted by the probability that the event will occur. So in the example above, the expected payout should be some fraction of $600,000, which could easily bring it below the $450,000 indifference point.  What's worse, that probability might be impossible to calculate for your average bondholder, which holds its bonds passively and is not likely to have access to up to the minute progress reports on the firm's financial condition or the restructuring process.

Presented by

Charles Davi is a capital and derivatives markets lawyer in New York City. He received his J.D. from New York University School of Law and B.A. in Computer Science from Hunter College.

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